

In the late 1960s, two elderly American tourists who had been touring Scotland reported that, in their travels, they had come to a Scottish town in which there was a great ruined cathedral. As they stood in the ruins, they saw a small boy and they asked him when the cathedral had been so badly damaged. He replied *in the war*. Their immediate interpretation, in the 1960s, was that he must be referring to the Second World War which had ended only twenty years earlier. But then they thought that the ruins looked as if they had been in their dilapidated state for much longer than that, so they asked the boy which war he meant. He replied *the war with the English*, which, they eventually discovered, had formally ended in 1745. **Brown (1998)**

In the [previous chapter](#), we focused on conceptual meaning and the relationships between words. There are other aspects of meaning that depend more on context and the communicative intentions of speakers. In Gill Brown's story, the American tourists and the Scottish boy seem to be using the word *war* with essentially the same basic meaning. However, the boy was using the word to refer to something the tourists didn't expect, hence the initial misunderstanding. Communication clearly depends on not only recognizing the meaning of words in an utterance, but recognizing what speakers mean by their utterances. The study of what speakers mean, or 'speaker meaning', is called **pragmatics**.

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## Invisible meaning

In many ways, pragmatics is the study of 'invisible' meaning, or how we recognize what is meant even when it isn't actually said or written. In order for that to happen, speakers (or writers) must be able to depend on a lot of shared assumptions and expectations when they try to communicate. The investigation of those assumptions and expectations provides us with some insights into how more is always being communicated than is said.


Driving by a parking garage, you may see a large sign like the one in the picture. You read the sign, knowing what each of the words means and what the sign as a whole means. However, you don't normally think that the sign is advertising a place where you can park your 'heated attendant'. (You take an attendant, you heat him/her up, and this is where you can park him/her.)

Alternatively, the sign may indicate a place where parking will be carried out by attendants who have been heated.



The words in the sign may allow these interpretations, but we would normally understand that we can park a car in this place, that it's a heated area, and that there will be an attendant to look after the car. So, how do we decide that the sign means this when the sign doesn't even have the word *car* on it? We must use the meanings of the words, the context in which they occur, and some pre-existing knowledge of what would be a likely message as we work toward a reasonable interpretation of what the producer of the sign intended it to convey. Our interpretation of the 'meaning' of the sign is not based solely on the words, but on what we think the writer intended to communicate.

In the other picture, assuming things are normal and this store has not gone into the business of selling young children over the counter, we can recognize an advertisement for a sale of clothes for those babies and toddlers. The word *clothes* doesn't appear in the message, but we can bring that idea to our interpretation of the message as we work out what the advertiser intended us to understand. We are actively involved in creating an interpretation of what we read and hear.



## Context

In our discussion of the last two examples, we emphasized the influence of context. There are different kinds of context. One kind is described as **linguistic context**, also known as **co-text**. The co-text of a word is the set of other words used in the same phrase or sentence. The surrounding co-text has a strong effect on what we think the word probably means. In the [last chapter](#), we identified the word *bank* as a homonym, a single form with more than one meaning. How do we usually know which meaning is intended in a particular sentence? We normally do so on the basis of linguistic context. If the word *bank* is used in a sentence together with words like *steep* or *overgrown*, we have no problem deciding which type of *bank* is meant. Or, if we hear someone say that she has to *get to the bank to withdraw some cash*, we know from this linguistic context which type of *bank* is intended.

More generally, we know how to interpret words on the basis of **physical context**. If we see the word *BANK* on the wall of a building in a city, the physical location will influence our interpretation. While this may seem rather obvious, we should keep in mind that it is not the actual physical situation ‘out there’ that constitutes ‘the context’ for interpreting words or sentences. The relevant context is our mental representation of those aspects of what is physically out there that we use in arriving at an interpretation. Our understanding of much of what we read and hear is tied to this processing of aspects of the physical context, particularly the time and place, in which we encounter linguistic expressions.

## Deixis

There are some very common words in our language that can't be interpreted at all if we don't know the context, especially the physical context of the speaker. These are words such as *here* and *there*, *this* or *that*, *now* and *then*, *yesterday*, *today* or *tomorrow*, as well as pronouns such as *you*, *me*, *she*, *him*, *it*, *them*. Some sentences of English are virtually impossible to understand if we don't know who is speaking, about whom, where and when. For example: *You'll have to bring it back tomorrow because she isn't here today.*

Out of context, this sentence is really vague. It contains a large number of expressions (*you*, *it*, *tomorrow*, *she*, *here*, *today*) that rely on knowledge of the immediate physical context for their interpretation (i.e. that the delivery driver will have to return on February 15th to 660 College Drive with the package labeled 'flowers, handle with care' addressed to Lisa Landry). Expressions such as *tomorrow* and *here* are obvious examples of bits of language that we can only understand in terms of the speaker's intended meaning. They are technically known as **deictic expressions**, from the Greek word **deixis** (pronounced like 'day-icksis'), which means 'pointing' via language.

We use deixis to point to things (*it*, *this*, *these boxes*) and people (*him*, *them*, *those idiots*), sometimes called **person deixis**. Words and phrases used to point to a location (*here*, *there*, *near that*) are examples of **spatial deixis**, and those used to point to a time (*now*, *then*, *last week*) are examples of **temporal deixis**.

All these deictic expressions have to be interpreted in terms of which person, place or time the speaker has in mind. We make a broad distinction between what is marked as close to the speaker (*this*, *here*, *now*) and what is distant (*that*, *there*, *then*). We can also indicate whether movement is away from the speaker's location (*go*) or toward the speaker's location (*come*). If you're looking for someone and she appears, moving toward you, you can say *Here she comes!* If, however, she is moving away from you in the distance, you're more likely to say *There she goes!* The same deictic effect explains the different situations in which you would tell someone to *Go to bed* versus *Come to bed*.

People can actually use deixis to have some fun. The bar owner who puts up a big sign that reads *Free Beer Tomorrow* (to get you to return to the bar) can always claim that you are just one day too early for the free drink.

## Reference

In discussing deixis, we assumed that the use of words to refer to people, places and times was a simple matter. However, words themselves don't refer to anything. People refer. We have to define **reference** as an act by which a speaker (or writer) uses language to enable a listener (or reader) to identify something. To perform an act of reference, we can use proper nouns (*Chomsky*, *Jennifer*, *Whiskas*), other nouns in phrases (*a writer*, *my friend*, *the cat*) or pronouns (*he*,

*she, it*). We sometimes assume that these words identify someone or something uniquely, but it is more accurate to say that, for each word or phrase, there is a ‘range of reference’. The words *Jennifer* or *friend* or *she* can be used to refer to many entities in the world. As we observed earlier, an expression such as *the war* doesn’t directly identify anything by itself, because its reference depends on who is using it.

We can also refer to things when we’re not sure what to call them. We can use expressions such as *the blue thing* and *that icky stuff* and we can even invent names. For instance, there was a man who always drove his motorcycle fast and loud through my neighborhood and was locally referred to as *Mr. Kawasaki*. In this case, a brand name for a motorcycle is being used to refer to a person.

## Inference

As in the ‘Mr. Kawasaki’ example, a successful act of reference depends more on the listener’s ability to recognize what we mean than on the listener’s ‘dictionary’ knowledge of a word we use. For example, in a restaurant, one waiter can ask another, *Where’s the spinach salad sitting?* and receive the reply, *He’s sitting by the door.* If you’re studying linguistics, you might ask someone, *Can I look at your Chomsky?* and get the response, *Sure, it’s on the shelf over there.* These examples make it clear that we can use names associated with things (*salad*) to refer to people, and use names of people (*Chomsky*) to refer to things. The key process here is called **inference**. An inference is additional information used by the listener to create a connection between what is said and what must be meant. In the last example, the listener has to operate with the inference: ‘if X is the name of the writer of a book, then X can be used to identify a copy of a book by that writer’. Similar types of inferences are necessary to understand someone who says that *Picasso is in the museum* or *We saw Shakespeare in London* or *Jennifer is wearing Calvin Klein*.

## Anaphora

We usually make a distinction between introducing new referents (*a puppy*) and referring back to them (*the puppy, it*).

*We saw a funny home video about a boy washing **a puppy** in a small bath.  
**The puppy** started struggling and shaking and the boy got really wet.  
 When he let go, **it** jumped out of the bath and ran away.*

In this type of referential relationship, the second (or subsequent) referring expression is an example of **anaphora** (‘referring back’). The first mention is called the **antecedent**. So, in our example, *a boy, a puppy* and *a small bath* are antecedents and *The puppy, the boy, he, it* and *the bath* are anaphoric expressions.

Anaphora can be defined as subsequent reference to an already introduced entity. Mostly we use anaphora in texts to maintain reference. The connection

between an antecedent and an anaphoric expression is created by use of a pronoun (*it*), or repetition of the noun with *the* (*the puppy*), or the use of other nouns that are related to the antecedent by inference, as in the following examples.

*We found **a house** to rent, but **the kitchen** was very small.*

*I caught **a bus** and asked **the driver** if it went near the downtown area.*

In the first example, we must make an inference like ‘if X is a house, then X has a kitchen’ in order to interpret the connection between antecedent *a house* and anaphoric expression *the kitchen*. In the second example, we must make an inference like ‘if X is a bus, then X has a driver’ in order to make the connection between *a bus* and *the driver*. In a context where both speakers easily make these types of inferences, it is possible to hear someone complain: *I was waiting for the bus, but he just drove by without stopping*. When the antecedent is *bus*, we might expect *it* as the pronoun, but use of the pronoun *he* obviously assumes an inference involving the driver.

We have used the term ‘inference’ here to describe what the listener (or reader) does. When we talk about an assumption made by the speaker (or writer), we usually talk about a ‘presupposition’.

## Presupposition

When we use a referring expression like *this*, *he* or *Shakespeare*, we usually assume that our listeners can recognize which referent is intended. In a more general way, we design our linguistic messages on the basis of large-scale assumptions about what our listeners already know. Some of these assumptions may be mistaken, of course, but mostly they’re appropriate. What a speaker (or writer) assumes is true or known by a listener (or reader) can be described as a **presupposition**.

If someone tells you *Your brother is waiting outside*, there is an obvious presupposition that you have a brother. If you are asked *Why did you arrive late?*, there is a presupposition that you did arrive late. And if you are asked the question *When did you stop smoking?*, there are at least two presuppositions involved. In asking this question, the speaker presupposes that you used to smoke and that you no longer do so. Questions like this, with built-in presuppositions, are very useful devices for interrogators or trial lawyers. If the defendant is asked by the prosecutor, *Okay, Mr. Smith, how fast were you going when you ran the red light?*, there is a presupposition that Mr. Smith did in fact run the red light. If he simply answers the *How fast* part of the question, by giving a speed, he is behaving as if the presupposition is correct.

One of the tests used to check for the presuppositions underlying sentences involves negating a sentence with a particular presupposition and checking if the presupposition remains true. Whether you say *My car is a wreck* or the negative version *My car is not a wreck*, the underlying presupposition (*I have a car*)

remains true despite the fact that the two sentences have opposite meanings. This is called the ‘constancy under negation’ test for identifying a presupposition. If someone says, *I used to regret marrying him, but I don’t regret marrying him now*, the presupposition (*I married him*) remains constant even though the verb *regret* changes from affirmative to negative.

## Speech acts

We have been considering ways in which we interpret the meaning of an utterance in terms of what the speaker intended to convey. We have not yet considered the fact that we usually know how the speaker intends us to ‘take’ (or ‘interpret the function of’) what is said. In very general terms, we can usually recognize the type of ‘action’ performed by a speaker with the utterance. We use the term **speech act** to describe actions such as ‘requesting’, ‘commanding’, ‘questioning’ or ‘informing’. We can define a speech act as the action performed by a speaker with an utterance. If you say, *I’ll be there at six*, you are not just speaking, you seem to be performing the speech act of ‘promising’.

## Direct and indirect speech acts

We usually use certain syntactic structures with the functions listed beside them in the following table.

	Structures	Functions
<i>Did you eat the pizza?</i>	Interrogative	Question
<i>Eat the pizza (please)!</i>	Imperative	Command (Request)
<i>You ate the pizza.</i>	Declarative	Statement

When an interrogative structure such as *Did you...?*, *Are they...?* or *Can we...?* is used with the function of a question, it is described as a **direct speech act**. For example, when we don’t know something and we ask someone to provide the information, we usually produce a direct speech act such as *Can you ride a bicycle?*

Compare that utterance with *Can you pass the salt?* In this second example, we are not really asking a question about someone’s ability. In fact, we don’t normally use this structure as a question at all. We normally use it to make a request. That is, we are using a syntactic structure associated with the function of a question, but in this case with the function of a request. This is an example of an **indirect speech act**. Whenever one of the structures in the set above is used to perform a function other than the one listed beside it on the same line, the result is an indirect speech act.

The utterance *You left the door open* has a declarative structure and, as a direct speech act, would be used to make a statement. However, if you say this to someone who has just come in (and it’s really cold outside), you would

probably want that person to close the door. You are not using the imperative structure. You are using a declarative structure to make a request. It's another example of an indirect speech act.

It is possible to have strange effects if one person fails to recognize another person's indirect speech act. Consider the following scene. A visitor to a city, carrying his luggage, looking lost, stops a passer-by.

VISITOR: *Excuse me. Do you know where the Ambassador Hotel is?*

PASSER-BY: *Oh sure, I know where it is.* (and walks away)

In this scene, the visitor uses a form normally associated with a question (*Do you know . . .?*), and the passer-by answers that question literally (*I know . . .*). That is, the passer-by is acting as if the utterance was a direct speech act instead of an indirect speech act used as a request for directions. Failure to recognize indirect speech acts can lead to some bizarre interactions.

The main reason we use indirect speech acts seems to be that actions such as requests presented in an indirect way (*Could you open that door for me?*) are generally considered to be more gentle or more polite in our society than direct speech acts (*Open that door for me!*). Exactly why they are considered to be more polite is based on some complex social assumptions.

## Politeness

We can think of politeness in general terms as having to do with ideas like being tactful, modest and nice to other people. In the study of linguistic politeness, the most relevant concept is 'face'. Your **face**, in pragmatics, is your public self-image. This is the emotional and social sense of self that everyone has and expects everyone else to recognize. **Politeness** can be defined as showing awareness of and consideration for another person's face.

If you say something that represents a threat to another person's self-image, that is called a **face-threatening act**. For example, if you use a direct speech act to get someone to do something (*Give me that paper!*), you are behaving as if you have more social power than the other person. If you don't actually have that social power (e.g. you're not a military officer or prison warden), then you are performing a face-threatening act. An indirect speech act, in the form associated with a question (*Could you pass me that paper?*), removes the assumption of social power. You're only asking if it's possible. This makes your request less threatening to the other person's face. Whenever you say something that lessens the possible threat to another's face, it can be described as a **face-saving act**.

## Negative and positive face

We have both a negative face and a positive face. (Note that 'negative' doesn't mean 'bad' here, it's simply the opposite of 'positive'.) **Negative face** is the need

to be independent and free from imposition. **Positive face** is the need to be connected, to belong, to be a member of the group. So, a face-saving act that emphasizes a person's negative face will show concern about imposition (*I'm sorry to bother you . . . ; I know you're busy, but . . .*). A face-saving act that emphasizes a person's positive face will show solidarity and draw attention to a common goal (*Let's do this together . . . ; You and I have the same problem, so . . .*).

Ideas about the appropriate language to mark politeness differ substantially from one culture to the next. If you have grown up in a culture that has directness as a valued way of showing solidarity, and you use direct speech acts (*Give me that chair!*) to people whose culture is more oriented to indirectness and avoiding direct imposition, then you will be considered impolite. You, in turn, may think of the others as vague and unsure of whether they really want something or are just asking about it (*Are you using this chair?*). In either case, it is the pragmatics that is misunderstood and, unfortunately, more will be communicated than is said.

Understanding how successful communication works is actually a process of interpreting not just what speakers say, but what they 'intend to mean'. We'll explore other aspects of this process in the [next chapter](#).

### ■ Study questions

- 1 What kinds of deictic expressions are used in this utterance (e.g. *I* = person deixis)? *I'm busy now so you can't stay here. Come back later.*
- 2 What are the anaphoric expressions in this sentence?

*Dr. Foster gave Andy some medicine after he told her about his headaches and she advised him to take the pills three times a day until the pain went away.*

- 3 What kind of inference is involved in interpreting each of these utterances?
  - (a) Teacher: *You can borrow my Shakespeare.*
  - (b) Waiter: *The ham sandwich left without paying.*
  - (c) Nurse: *The hernia in room 5 wants to talk to the doctor.*
  - (d) Dentist: *My eleven-thirty canceled so I had an early lunch.*
- 4 What is one obvious presupposition of a speaker who says:
  - (a) *Your clock isn't working.*
  - (b) *Where did he find the money?*
  - (c) *We regret buying that car.*
  - (d) *The king of France is bald.*
- 5 Someone stands between you and the TV set you're watching, so you decide to say one of the following. Identify which would be direct and which would be indirect speech acts.
  - (a) *Move!*
  - (b) *You're in the way.*
  - (c) *Could you please sit down?*
  - (d) *Please get out of the way.*

- 6 In these examples, is the speaker appealing to positive or negative face?
- If you're free, there's going to be a party at Yuri's place on Saturday.*
  - Let's go to the party at Yuri's place on Saturday. Everyone's invited.*

### ■ Research tasks

- A What do you think is meant by the statement: "A context is a psychological construct" (Sperber & Wilson, 1995)?
- B Why is the concept of 'deictic projection' necessary for the analysis of the following deictic expressions?
- On a map/directory: *YOU ARE HERE.*
  - On a telephone answering machine: *I am not here now.*
  - Watching a horse race: *Oh, no. I'm in last place.*
  - In a car that won't start: *Maybe I'm out of gas.*
  - Pointing to an empty chair in class: *Where is she today?*
- C Which of these utterances contain 'performative verbs' and how did you decide?
- I apologize.*
  - He said he was sorry.*
  - I bet you \$20.*
  - She won the bet.*
  - I drive a Mercedes.*
  - You must have a lot of money.*
- D The following phrases were all on signs advertising sales.
- What is being sold in each case and (if you know) what other words would you add to the description to make it clearer?
  - What is the underlying structure of each phrase? For example, *Furniture Sale* might have the structure: 'Someone is selling furniture'. Would the same structure be appropriate for *Garage Sale* and the others?

<i>Back-to-School Sale</i>	<i>Dollar Sale</i>	<i>One Cent Sale</i>
<i>Bake Sale</i>	<i>Foundation Sale</i>	<i>Plant Sale</i>
<i>Big Screen Sale</i>	<i>Furniture Sale</i>	<i>Sidewalk Sale</i>
<i>Clearance Sale</i>	<i>Garage Sale</i>	<i>Spring Sale</i>
<i>Close-out Sale</i>	<i>Labor Day Sale</i>	<i>Tent Sale</i>
<i>Colorful White Sale</i>	<i>Liquidation Sale</i>	<i>Yard Sale</i>

### ■ Discussion topics/projects

- I Let's assume you were in a situation where you asked a parent if you could go out to a dance and you received one of these two responses. Do you think that these responses have the same or different 'meanings'?

*Yes, of course, go.*

*If you want, you can go.*

Next, consider this situation, described in Tannen (1986).

*A Greek woman explained how she and her father (and later her husband) communicated. If she wanted to do something, like go to a dance, she had to ask her father for permission. He never said no. But she could tell from the way he said yes whether or not he meant it. If he said something like “Yes, of course, go,” then she knew he thought it was a good idea. If he said something like “If you want, you can go,” then she understood that he didn’t think it was a good idea, and she wouldn’t go.*

- Why do you think ‘he never said no’ (when he was communicating ‘No’)?
- How would you analyze the two speech acts reported as responses in this passage?
- Are you familiar with any other comparable situations where ‘more is communicated than is said’?

(For background reading, see chapter 4 of Tannen, 1986.)

- II What counts as polite behavior can differ substantially from one group or culture to the next. Below are some basic descriptions from Lakoff (1990) of three types of politeness, called distance, deference and camaraderie. As you read these descriptions, try to decide which type you are most familiar with and whether you have encountered the others on any occasion. What kind of language do you think is characteristic of these different types of politeness?

*Distance politeness is the civilized human analogue to the territorial strategies of other animals. An animal sets up physical boundary markers (the dog and the hydrant) to signal its fellows: My turf, stay out. We, being symbol-using creatures, create symbolic fences.*

*Distancing cultures weave remoteness into their language.*

*Another culture might avoid the danger of conflict by adopting a strategy of deferential politeness. If a participant decides that whatever is to happen in a conversation – both what is said and what it is to mean – is up to the other person, conflict can easily be avoided.*

*Where distance politeness more or less assumes equality between participants, deference works by debasing one or both.*

*While distance politeness has been characteristic of the middle and upper classes in most of Europe for a very long time, deference has been typical in many Asian societies. But it is also the preferred model of interaction for women in the majority of societies, either always or only when talking to men.*

*A third strategy (camaraderie) that has recently emerged in this culture makes a different assumption: that interaction and connection are good in themselves, that openness is the greatest sign of courtesy.*

*In a camaraderie system, the appearance of openness and niceness is to be sought above all else. There is no holding back, nothing is too terrible to say.*

(For background reading, see chapter 2 of Lakoff, 1990.)

### ■ Further reading

Basic introductions to pragmatics can be found in Cutting (2002), Grundy (2000), LoCastro (2003), Verschueren (1999) and Yule (1996). Other textbooks are Green (1996), Levinson (1983), Mey (2001) and Thomas (1995). More specifically, on context, see the contributions in Malmkjær & Williams (1998), on reference and deixis, see part 4 of Cruse (2004), on anaphora, see Cornish (1999) or Fox (1993), on speech acts, see Geis (1995), on face, see Goffman (1967), and on politeness, see Watts (2003). For a comprehensive review of research, see Horn & Ward (2004).